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CAN JAILBREAKING PUT YOU IN JAIL, BROKE?
Trace H. Jackson*
Abstract
Most Americans own at least one “smart device.” These include
smartphones and video game consoles. Device manufacturers limit an
owner’s use of his smart device through both licensing agreements and
technological measures. While the public largely ignores licensing
agreements, the technological measures actively prevent an owner from
using his device in whatever manner he sees fit, despite the fact that he
owns the device. This prevention has led people to develop methods to
circumvent these technological measures. These methods are devicedependent and include “jailbreaking” (iPhones), “modding” (video game
consoles), and “rooting” (Androids).
This Note explores whether jailbreak developers or jailbreak users
violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030. Congress
passed the Act in response to the threat of criminals hacking into
government or bank computers. As such, it makes little sense to apply the
Act to people who want more freedom of use of their devices. A large
number of smart device users employ some form of jailbreaking. The fact
that the government could prosecute them under an anti-hacking statute
for violating the licensing agreement for their devices, paves the way for
many new and terrifying prosecutions.
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INTRODUCTION
A “smart device” is a device that can connect to other devices or
networks and operate “interactively and somewhat autonomously.”1
Examples of smart devices include video game consoles and
smartphones. To operate interactively and autonomously, these devices
typically come with software called an operating system (OS). For
example, Microsoft’s Xbox One video game console comes with a
variant of Microsoft’s Windows 8,2 and Apple’s iPhone runs iOS.3
While these OSes primarily enable the operations of the device, they
also limit the activities of the user. For example, iOS does not permit the
user to install any applications (apps) besides those that Apple has
officially approved for use in its App Store.4 Additionally, Android
phones have a feature called “wireless tethering,” which allows owners
to use their phones as Wi-Fi hotspots for other devices, such as laptops.5
However, telecom companies such as Verizon forced Android developers
to restrict this ability so that only customers who paid extra for the feature
could use it.6
Device manufacturers have this level of control over end use of the
device because of their control over the OS. They have this control
because the user does not own most of the software she uses; she licenses
it.7 This lack of ownership allows the developer more control over the
device’s use because the user must typically agree to an End User
Licensing Agreement (EULA)8 of the software to install it. EULAs serve
as clickwrap agreements, permitting developers to impose their own sets
1. See Wi-Fi Connectivity Increases Purchase Likelihood for Smart Home Devices, WI-FI
ALLIANCE, http://www.wi-fi.org/news-events/newsroom/wi-fi-connectivity-increases-purchaselikelihood-for-smart-home-devices (last visited Sept. 10, 2015).
2. Dina Bass, Xbox One Has Not One, but Three Operating Systems, BLOOMBERG (Nov.
22, 2013, 7:55 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-22/xbox-one-has-not-one-butthree-operating-systems.html.
3. iOS 9, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/ios/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2015).
4. See Sam Costello, Can I Get iPhone Apps Without iTunes?, ABOUTTECH
http://ipod.about.com/od/iphoneapps/f/iphone-apps-without-itunes.htm (last visited Sept. 10,
2015).
5. See Brian Nadel, Wi-Fi Tethering 101: Use a Smartphone as a Mobile Hotspot,
COMPUTERWORLD (Nov. 4, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2499772/m
obile-wireless/wi-fi-tethering-101-use-a-smartphone-as-a-mobile-hotspot.html.
6. A settlement with the FCC has since ended this practice. See Marguerite Reardon, What
Verizon’s FCC Tethering Settlement Means to You (FAQ), CNET (Aug. 2, 2012 10:53 AM),
http://www.cnet.com/news/what-verizons-fcc-tethering-settlement-means-to-you-faq/.
7. 1 MICHAEL D. SCOTT ET AL., SCOTT ON MULTIMEDIA LAW § 23.01 (3d ed. Supp. 2014).
8. EULA is the common term when dealing with software. Some developers also refer to
licensing agreements as “terms of use” or “terms of service” interchangeably, though they have a
more nuanced meaning.
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of laws on the use of their software.9 Despite their perceived
unconscionability, courts have upheld clickwrap agreements as valid
contracts between the developer and user.10 Thus, circumvention of
EULAs may be tantamount to breach of contract.11
Because manufacturers bundle smart devices with the software that
makes the devices operable (OSes), EULAs limit the use of smart
devices.12 This notion is fundamentally at odds with the average person’s
concept of ownership of his own devices. One of the most basic sticks in
the property rights bundle is the ability to use the property in any manner
that the owner sees fit, provided that the use does not negatively affect
others.13 Due to the EULAs, that is not the case for smart devices.
As a result, many enterprising users of these devices seek a way to
circumvent the limitations that the manufacturers impose on smart
devices. They accomplish this circumvention through methods known as
“modding” (video game consoles), “jailbreaking” (iPhones), and
“rooting” (Androids).14 Although there is a technical distinction between
each of these, and although some Android developers permit rooting, this
Note refers to them collectively as “jailbreaking.” Jailbreaking restores
freedom of use to the users15 and allows them to make changes to their
devices, such as changing the OS,16 developing and installing
unauthorized apps,17 unlocking smartphones to switch carriers,18 and
even altering the function of the device.19 Naturally, the ability to make
these alterations makes jailbreaking very popular.20
9. See, e.g., Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine
for Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REV. 107, 165 (2001).
10. See, e.g., I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 (D.
Mass. 2002). But see Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991)
(holding that shrinkwrap licenses are not binding).
11. Complaint at 53, Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC v. Hotz, No. 3:11CV00167 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Sony Complaint].
12. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 1.07 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
13. 63C AM. JUR. 2D Property § 31 (2014).
14. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Nexus Crystals: Crystallizing Limits on Contractual Control
of Virtual Worlds, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 43, 45 (2011).
15. For a brief technical explanation, see infra Section II.B.
16. See, e.g., CYANOGENMOD, http://www.cyanogenmod.org/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2015).
17. See Ali Hassan Mahdi, Jailbreak Apps and Tweaks, IPHONE HACKS (Sept. 8, 2015),
http://www.iphonehacks.com/jailbreak-apps.
18. It was necessary to jailbreak the phone to unlock it prior to the passage of the Unlocking
Consumer Choice and Wireless Competition Act, Pub. L. No. 113-144 (2014).
19. See, e.g., Alan Henry, Turn a $99 Nook into a Fully Fledged Android Tablet in Four
Easy Steps, LIFEHACKER (Feb. 29, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://lifehacker.com/5889158/turn-a-99nook-into-a-fully-fledged-android-tablet-in-four-easy-steps.
20. One jailbreaking program for iOS 6 was installed more than seven million times within
six days after its release in February of 2013. Anthony Wing Kosner, What 7 Million Jailbreaks
Are Saying. Is Apple Listening?, FORBES (Feb. 10, 2013, 8:06 AM),
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However, most device developers do not approve of such
alterations—otherwise they would not have such restrictive EULAs in
the first place. While the developers have some technological deterrents
against jailbreakers,21 they also seek legal deterrents. This is in part
because of the ease of legal intimidation in the jailbreaking community.
Most users who develop jailbreaks do so as a hobby with no expectation
of payment.22 As a result, if a device developer threatens to sue a jailbreak
developer, the jailbreak developer would likely prefer to settle or
acquiesce to a cease-and-desist demand, rather than fight it in court,
because the jailbreak developer receives minimal financial gain. Thus,
the jailbreaking community is one where legal bullying works extremely
well, and the lawyer who can throw in as many allegations as she can
without violating Rule 11’s proscription of unmeritorious pleadings23
will likely be successful.24
This Note discusses the civil and criminal liability of a jailbreak user
and a jailbreak developer under one of these possible allegations: a
violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).25 Part I
provides the necessary background for the discussion, including an
explanation of its disjointed legislative history and the relevant technical
explanation of jailbreaking. Part II applies the CFAA to the act of
jailbreaking to conclude that using a jailbreak may violate the CFAA, but
developing one almost certainly does.

http://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonykosner/2013/02/10/what-7-million-jailbreaks-are-saying-isapple-listening/. One popular video game console modding website, ps3hax.net, had over 380,000
registered users as of June 30, 2016, many of whom were actively involved in the developments
of mods for the PlayStation 3. See PS3Hax Network – Playstation 3 and Playstation 4 Hacks and
Mods, PS3HAX, http://www.ps3hax.net/forum.php (last visited June 30, 2016). The number of
downloads of the mods is likely substantially higher.
21. See generally PATRICIA L. BELLIA ET AL., CYBERLAW: PROBLEMS OF POLICY AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 382–85 (4th ed. 2011) (describing several technological
protection measures).
22. See A Beginners Guide to Developing for a Jailbroken iOS Platform, PRIYAONTECH
(Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.priyaontech.com/2012/01/a-beginners-guide-to-developing-for-ajailbroken-ios-platform/. But see Ian Shapira, Once the Hobby of Tech Geeks, iPhone Jailbreaking
Now a Lucrative Industry, WASH. POST (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/once-the-hobby-of-tech-geeks-iphone-jailbreaking-now-a-lucrative-industry/
2011/04/01/AFBJ0VpC_story.html.
23. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
24. See, e.g., Sony Complaint, supra note 11. This is not in any way to allege that Sony
engaged in the aforementioned tactic of legal bullying. This is merely to give an example of a
corporation employing as many legal theories as possible against an underrepresented defendant
who had no financial incentive to fight and who ultimately settled.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
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I. BACKGROUND
Analyzing whether jailbreaking violates the CFAA requires a brief
explanation of two key background concepts. First, this Part discusses the
legislative history of the CFAA, which originally sought to protect
government and bank computers but which now covers any computer in
interstate commerce (i.e., nearly all of them). Second, it provides a small
technical explanation of jailbreaking and modding.
A. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
The CFAA, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030, is a statute aimed primarily
at computer hacking activities. Congress enacted the law as a proactive
measure against some foreseeable computer-related crimes that might
have escaped prosecution under the then-existing giants of federal
criminal law: mail fraud and wire fraud.26 It amended the previous
version of 18 U.S.C. § 1030, which was part of the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984.27 The original CFAA proscribed “knowingly
access[ing] a computer without [or exceeding] authorization”28 and the
following three activities: (1) obtaining information that the federal
government determined needed protection against public release to
protect interests of national defense or foreign relations;29 (2) obtaining
financial information from a bank;30 or (3) using, modifying, destroying,
or disclosing information, or preventing authorized use of a computer
used by or on behalf of the federal government.31
Aside from an additional provision for prohibiting conspiracy to
commit an offense under the CFAA,32 the statute prohibited no other
conduct. It is important to note that Congress narrowly tailored each of
these offenses to protect a strong federal interest. In particular, the first
and third offenses in the numbered list above involve attacks upon the
federal government itself, while the second offense implicates interstate
commerce.33 Congress also narrowly tailored this statute to ensure an
26. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 6 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3692. See
generally OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUCATION, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS,
PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES 1 (2010), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/
docs/ccmanual.pdf [hereinafter CYBERCRIME MANUAL] (examining the federal laws that relate to
computer crimes).
27. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, ch. XXI, §§ 2101–2103, 98 Stat. 1837, 2190 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1) (Supp. II 1984) (amended 1986).
29. Id.
30. Id. § 1030(a)(2).
31. Id. § 1030(a)(3).
32. Id. § 1030(b).
33. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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“appropriate balance between the Federal Government’s interest in
computer crime and the interests and abilities of the States to proscribe
and punish such offenses.”34
In 1986, Congress added a definition and three new offenses to the
CFAA, thus further expanding federal jurisdiction.35 Congress expanded
the class of computers that the statute protected by defining a “federal
interest” computer as a computer used by or on behalf of the federal
government or financial institutions, or “one of two or more computers
used in committing the offense, not all of which are located in the same
State.”36 The first new offense paralleled the language found in the wire37
and mail fraud38 statutes, thus criminalizing trespassing on a federal
interest computer in such a way that furthered a scheme to defraud and
that resulted in the trespasser obtaining something of value.39 The second
new offense was accessing a federal interest computer; altering,
damaging, or destroying information on that computer; and either causing
losses aggregating to over $1000 in a one-year period or interfering with
medical care.40 The final new offense was trafficking passwords either
that belonged to a government computer or in such a way as to affect
interstate commerce.41
These changes came at an interesting time in American legal history.
In particular, internet use was in its infancy, and Commerce Clause
jurisprudence was at its most liberal.42 This amendment is important
because it allowed the prosecution of one private individual who harmed
another private individual, in contrast to the original statute, which
required the hacker to harm the government or a bank in order to face
prosecution.
The current version of the CFAA expands the definition of a federal
interest computer further. In addition to those computers used by
financial institutions or the government,43 the statute protects any
34. S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2482.
35. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (1986)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)). Interestingly, Congress also changed the mens
rea requirement in some of the provisions from “knowingly” to “intentionally,” as they felt the
need to protect people who accidentally stumbled into someone else’s data. S. REP. NO. 99-432,
at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2483.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2) (Supp. III 1985) (amended 1988).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012).
38. Id. § 1341.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (Supp. III 1983) (amended 1988).
40. Id. § 1030(a)(5).
41. Id. § 1030(a)(6).
42. See generally 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4.8 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing the shifting scope of Congress’s
Commerce Clause power).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(A) (2012).
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computer “used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or
communication.”44 As noted in Section II.A, infra, this extremely broad
definition covers almost any conceivable computer. This increase in
scope makes sense in light of the structure of the modern Internet.45
Moreover, the range of offenses has dramatically increased from the 1986
version. The two offenses relevant to the jailbreaking analysis are 18
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C), which proscribes “intentionally access[ing] a
computer without authorization or exceed[ing] authorized access, and
thereby obtains . . . information from any protected computer,”46 and
§ 1030(a)(5)(A), which deals directly with hacking by prohibiting
“knowingly caus[ing] the transmission of a program, information, code,
or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally caus[ing]
damage without authorization, to a protected computer.”47
B. Jailbreaking
This Note considers two types of “hacking”: jailbreaking and
modding. Although one can consider them the same from a legal
standpoint, technically they are different. It is important to understand
some of the technical details of each.
Fundamentally, jailbreaking refers to the circumvention of the
iPhone’s authenticity checks. When a user turns her iPhone on, iOS
checks that the OS’s components are unchanged from Apple’s official
version.48 The primary goal of jailbreaking is to disable these checks by
exploiting the system software to load the user’s own software onto the
phone.49 This enables users to break out of the “jail” of the limited set of
directories on the user’s phone to which iOS permits access.50 Similarly,
if a Windows computer only allowed a user to access the user’s My
Documents folder, then jailbreaking would be analogous to restoring the
user’s ability to access the entire computer.51
44. Id. § 1030(e)(2)(B).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 554 F.3d 208, 210, 215 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that
the intrastate transmission of child pornography over the Internet constituted interstate commerce
because the data packets containing the pornography were split up and sent through an uncertain
path that likely went out of the state to reach the destination).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
47. Id. § 1030(a)(5)(A).
48. See Michael K. Cheng, Note, iPhone Jailbreaking Under the DMCA: Towards a
Functionalist Approach in Anti-Circumvention, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 215, 222 (2010).
49. Id.
50. See generally iPhone Forensics—A Series #2, MOBILE DEVICE FORENSICS (Sept. 17,
2008), http://mobileforensics.wordpress.com/2008/09/17/iphone-forensics-a-series-2/ (discussing
the technical aspects of jailbreaking an iPhone).
51. See Cheng, supra note 48, at 222 (“In its default state, the iPhone Software only allows
the user to access the file system’s ‘/private/var/mobile/Media’ directory.”).
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The video game console analogue is modding. Mods come in both
physical and virtual forms—a user may install a physical “mod chip”52 or
may download a mod program that takes advantage of exploits in the
system’s security.53 These mods can serve a variety of functions,
including changing the OS entirely, deleting the OS’s check that a chosen
game is authentic, and restoring root access like the iPhone jailbreak.54
Functionally and legally, this is equivalent to jailbreaking because both
involve exploiting the system in order for a user to transmit his own code,
so this Note will refer to both processes as “jailbreaking.”
II. JAILBREAKING VIOLATES THE CFAA
The CFAA sets out seven general offenses in subsection (a), provides
the criminal punishment factors in subsection (c), and imposes civil
liability in subsection (g). The two most relevant subsections to the
jailbreaking analysis are (a)(2)(C) and (a)(5)(A). Subsection (a)(2)(C)
prohibits gaining unauthorized access or exceeding authorized access to
a “protected computer,” and using that access to obtain information.55
Given that merely viewing information qualifies as obtaining it for the
purpose of the CFAA,56 the only issues for proving a violation of
(a)(2)(C) are whether smart devices are protected computers and whether
jailbreaking them exceeds authorized access. Section II.A establishes that
smartphones and video game consoles are protected computers within the
meaning of the statute. Section II.B considers whether jailbreaking
constitutes “unauthorized access” or “exceeding authorized access”
within the meaning of the statute.
Subsection (a)(5)(A) prohibits transmitting a program (like a
jailbreak) to a protected computer and, as a result of the transmission,
causing damage without authorization.57 Section II.C of this Note
considers whether jailbreaking constitutes “damage” to the computer
within the meaning of the statute. Section II.D explores the criminal and
52. See generally Jason Rybka, Modchips—What Are They and Should You Use One?,
ABOUT TECH, http://vgstrategies.about.com/od/faqglossary/a/modchips.htm (last visited Sept. 10,
2015) (illustrating the pros and cons of modding a console).
53. See, e.g., MICHAEL STEIL, 17 MISTAKES MICROSOFT MADE IN THE XBOX SECURITY
SYSTEM, http://events.ccc.de/congress/2005/fahrplan/attachments/591-paper_xbox.pdf (describing
such possible exploits in the Microsoft Xbox’s security system).
54. See, e.g., Patrick Schmid, Modding the Xbox into the Ultimate Multimedia Center,
TOM’S HARDWARE (May 11, 2004, 11:00 AM), http://www.tomshardware.com/reviews/moddingxbox-ultimate-multimedia-center,807.html.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2012).
56. S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 6–7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2484
(“‘[O]btaining information’ in this context includes mere observation of the data. Actual
asportation . . . need not be proved . . . .”).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A).
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civil liability based on these offenses.
A. Smartphones and Video Game Consoles Are
Protected Computers
The first element of any violation of the CFAA is that the “victim”
computer must be a protected computer within the meaning of the statute.
This means that the device must be both a “computer” and “protected.”58
Subsection 1030(e)(1) defines a computer as “an electronic . . . or other
high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or
storage functions.”59 Smart devices fit this definition.
Intuitively, assuming the CFAA’s definition of “computer” applies to
home computers and laptops, then both video game consoles and
smartphones are computers. A home computer has a publicly released OS
(e.g., Windows), reads any data format for which the computer has an
input mechanism (e.g., the computer can read information from a CD
using its CD-ROM drive), and displays that information to a display
device (e.g., a monitor or a television).60 Similarly, a video game console
is a specialized computer that has a proprietary OS, reads a proprietary
data format (such as cartridges, CDs, or BluRay discs), and displays that
data on a television. In a smartphone, the underlying hardware is identical
and even more powerful than the hardware on computers when Congress
passed the CFAA in 1986.61
Courts have agreed that smart devices are computers. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held in United States v. Kramer62 that
any device with a “microchip” is a computer.63 The device in that case
was a non-smartphone, the Motorola Razr V3.64 The court reasoned that
given § 1030(e)(1)’s requirement that the device merely process data and
perform logical, arithmetic, or storage functions—the functions of a
microchip—any device with a microchip must qualify as a computer.65
The cellphone had a microchip, so it was a computer. The court also
recognized how broad this definition could be,66 and a plain language
58. Id. § 1030(e)(1)–(2).
59. Id. § 1030(e)(1).
60. See Shawn E. Tuma, “What Does CFAA Mean and Why Should I Care?”—A Primer
on the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act for Civil Litigators, 63 S.C. L. REV. 141, 169 (2011).
61. See id.
62. 631 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2011).
63. See id. at 901–03. Note that “microchip” is a brand name, like “Kleenex,” but the court
also discusses electronic data processors generally, which is probably what the court meant.
64. Id. at 901.
65. See id. at 902.
66. The court quotes Steve Wozniak, cofounder of Apple, as observing that “everything has
a computer in it nowadays.” Id. at 901 (quoting Mark Milian, Apple’s Steve Wozniak: ‘We’ve Lost
a Lot of Control,’ CNN (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/innovation/
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reading of the statute does not admit a narrower definition. A federal
court in California also held that video game consoles are computers, at
least for the purposes of granting a preliminary injunction. 67 Thus,
intuitively and legally, smart devices are computers.
The harder question, however, is whether these devices qualify as
protected computers. Subsection 1030(e)(2)(B) defines a protected
computer as one “used in or affecting interstate . . . commerce.”68 When
Congress uses the term “affects interstate commerce,” Congress
generally means to regulate all activity that it may reach under the
commerce power.69 Therefore, the issue is whether the use of these
devices is an activity that Congress has the power to regulate. Under
modern Commerce Clause theory, Congress may regulate an activity if it
is an economic activity with a substantial effect on interstate commerce.70
This is true even if the activity is a purely local one that affects interstate
commerce only in the aggregate.71 Both video game consoles and
smartphones affect interstate commerce.
Modern video game consoles tend to be connected to the Internet.
Services such as Microsoft’s Xbox Live and Sony’s PlayStation Network
allow users to connect with other users over the Internet and, more
importantly, to purchase games and other add-ons from the developer’s
store.72 These services tend to be subscription-based, so users wishing to
log onto a service such as Xbox Live must pay for the privilege of doing
so.73 By purchasing a subscription, users outside of Microsoft’s home
state of Washington are clearly engaging in interstate commerce.74
Moreover, even users within Washington affect interstate commerce in
12/08/steve.wozniak.computers/); see also Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1577–78 (2010) (noting that this definition could
include “coffeemakers, microwave ovens, watches, . . . televisions, . . . CDs, DVDs, and other
electronic storage devices”).
67. See Sony Comp. Entm’t Am. v. Hotz, No. CV11 000167, 2011 WL 347137 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 27, 2011) (order granting preliminary injunction).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2) (2012).
69. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960) (holding that the term “affecting
trade” in the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, demonstrates a Congressional intent to “use all the
constitutional power Congress has”).
70. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995).
71. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942).
72. See, e.g., Xbox 360 Marketplace, MICROSOFT, http://marketplace.xbox.com/en-US/
(last visited Sept. 14, 2015).
73. See, e.g., Xbox Live, MICROSOFT, http://www.xbox.com/en-US/LIVE (last visited Sept.
14, 2015).
74. A 2010 Forbes article estimated that Microsoft made at least $625 million in global
sales of Xbox Live subscriptions. Oliver Chiang, Microsoft’s Xbox Live Is Making Boatloads of
Money on Virtual Goods, FORBES (June 17, 2010, 6:15 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/velocity/
2010/06/17/microsofts-xbox-live-is-making-boatloads-on-virtual-goods/.
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the aggregate by purchasing a service from an international company
such as Microsoft, thus giving these companies more assets with which
to affect interstate commerce.75
A harder case may be those console owners who do not purchase a
service such as Xbox Live. This accounts for many owners who mod their
video game consoles, because most developers require subscribers to
update their consoles frequently, and during the updates, the developers
impose authenticity checks to ensure that the consoles are not modded.76
As a result, such console owners would be concerned with connecting
their consoles to the Internet, which might sever the link to interstate
commerce. Although the console owner in this case would have
participated in interstate commerce by purchasing the device, her use of
it would not affect interstate commerce.
However, a court could still find a link to commerce by analogizing
to the rule of Gonzalez v. Raich.77 In Gonzalez, the plaintiff sought a
declaratory judgment that the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) did not
apply to her because she grew marijuana in her backyard for her own
medicinal use.78 She argued that because the marijuana was for her own
use and would never enter into interstate commerce, the application of
the CSA to her was an unconstitutional overstep of the limitations of the
commerce power.79 This use of marijuana was a purely local, intrastate,
noneconomic activity.80 However, the Supreme Court held that this
regulation of the plaintiff’s activities was within the commerce power.81
The Court reasoned that the plaintiff’s activities were regulated by a
larger, legitimate federal scheme.82 As a result, even though the
regulation “ensnare[d] some purely intrastate activity,” the CSA was
valid as applied to the plaintiff.83 The Court seemed concerned with the
ease with which even some of the plaintiff’s own marijuana might leak
out into the market, and that was enough to regulate the plaintiff’s
75. Under the Hobbs Act, depletion of assets qualifies as affecting interstate commerce.
See, e.g., United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 762–63 (2005). It follows that increasing assets
also qualifies.
76. Adrian Kingsley-Hughes, Microsoft “Bricked” 360s with “Live” Update, ZDNET (Nov.
6, 2006, 11:02 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/hardware/microsoft-bricked-360s-with-liveupdate/137. In the most severe cases, this can render the console inoperable (“bricking” the
console).
77. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
78. Id. at 7.
79. See id. at 8.
80. The mere use of a video game console is debatably economic, since a video game
console has few uses when the user neither connects it to the Internet nor purchases any games
for it.
81. Id. at 22.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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activities under the CSA.84
Video game consoles that are not connected to the Internet are similar.
Although using the game consoles without connecting is purely local, a
court might find the regulation of such devices to be part of a larger
“regulatory scheme” that “could be undercut” if the devices were not
regulated (due to the ease with which a user can connect his device to the
Internet).85 However, if a court accepts that interpretation, then it is
debatable whether the word “protected” has any meaning within the
statute. Courts interpret statutes so that every word has meaning;86
consequently, a court might reject this interpretation on the basis that it
would render the word “protected” meaningless. On the other hand, the
term may be merely a “jurisdictional element which would ensure,
through case-by-case inquiry, that the [computer] in question affects
interstate commerce.”87 On balance, the Gonzalez argument seems more
applicable to video game consoles because of their potential for
connectivity to the Internet (and thus engage in interstate commerce).
Thus, the use of both connected and non-connected video game consoles
affect interstate commerce and therefore are “protected computers”
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B).
Smartphones are protected computers, for many of the same reasons
given above. Most smartphone owners have a data plan, meaning that the
smartphones are connected to the Internet.88 Some courts have held that
merely being connected to the Internet is sufficient to meet the interstate
commerce element, finding “that the Internet is an instrumentality [or]
channel of interstate commerce,”89 thus granting Congress the authority
to regulate it.90 For those smartphone users who do not have a data plan,
the Gonzalez argument above would likely persuade a court that Congress
may also regulate these users.
B. Jailbreaking May Exceed Authorized Access
Another element for several of the offenses listed within § 1030(a) is
access to the protected computer that either is unauthorized or exceeds
84. Id.
85. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
86. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (“In construing a statute we are
obligated to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used.”).
87. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
88. According to a 2013 Nielsen report, ninety-six percent of smartphone owners in the
United States have a data plan. NIELSEN, THE MOBILE CONSUMER: A GLOBAL SNAPSHOT 15
(2013),
http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/uk/en/documents/Mobile-ConsumerReport-2013.pdf.
89. United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 2006).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2007); see also
CYBERCRIME MANUAL, supra note 26, at 4–5.
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authorized access.91 The CFAA defines “exceeds authorized access” as
“access[ing] a computer with authorization and . . . us[ing] such access
to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not
entitled so to obtain or alter.”92 However, this statutory definition does
not alone provide much guidance for the jailbreaking analysis. On one
hand, a reasonable interpretation of the statute as applied to the
jailbreaking problem is that the jailbreaker (user or developer) accesses
his device with authorization because he bought it. On the other hand,
because the word “entitled” implies a superior authority that sets limits
on access, it follows that this authority is the same one that grants
“authorization.”93 There are three competing views on the scope of this
authorization: a broad interpretation that covers violations of terms of
service agreements, such as EULAs; a narrow interpretation that excludes
them;94 and a failure of interpretation that declares the term
“unauthorized” void for vagueness.95
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits
subscribe to a broad interpretation of culpable unauthorized access.96 For
example, in EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc.,97 the defendant
created a scraper program to glean information from the plaintiff’s
website.98 In doing so, the defendant used confidential information that
he was privy to as a result of his previous employment with the plaintiff.99
This violated his confidentiality agreement with the plaintiff, which was
enough for the court to find that the defendant’s access to the plaintiff’s
website was unauthorized.100 The court reasoned that the defendant
91. 18 U.S.C. §1030(a) (2012).
92. Id. § 1030(e)(6) (emphasis added).
93. Courts occasionally conflate “unauthorized access” with “exceeding authorized
access.” However, this might be harmless, as some courts, such as the Drew and Nosal courts, see
a violation of a terms of service agreement that exceeds authorized access as terminating the right
to access a computer (thus rendering further access unauthorized). See infra text accompanying
notes 103–37.
94. Robert D. Sowell, Comment, Misuse of Information Under the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act: On What Side of the Circuit Split Will the Second and Third Circuits Wind Up?, 66
FLA. L. REV. 1747, 1748 (2012).
95. See Kerr, supra note 66, at 1572.
96. See Sowell, supra note 94, at 1751. Notably, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit has also used the broad interpretation, but it did so in the context of an employee violating
his employer’s computer use policy. See Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 419
(7th Cir. 2006); Sowell, supra note 94, at 1752. The Seventh Circuit used agency law, rather than
contract law, to find unauthorized access, so its analysis is irrelevant to jailbreaking, where there
is no agent. Id. at 420; Sowell, supra note 94, at 1752.
97. 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001).
98. Id. at 580–81.
99. Id. at 582.
100. Id. at 582–83.
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entered into the confidentiality agreement voluntarily, and that the
defendant knew he violated the confidentiality agreement by providing
the necessary information for the scraper.101 Thus, according to this broad
interpretation, any knowing violation of a voluntary agreement between
the party providing a service and the party accessing the service
constitutes unauthorized access for the purposes of the CFAA.102
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Ninth Circuits use a
narrower interpretation of “unauthorized access.”103 In United States v.
Nosal,104 the defendant asked employees of a company to violate their
computer use policy that forbade the dissemination of confidential
information from the company’s computers, and the Government charged
the defendant with violating the CFAA under an accomplice liability
theory.105 The en banc Ninth Circuit held that a mere violation of a terms
of service agreement could not rise to the level of unauthorized access for
the purposes of the CFAA.106 The court based its reasoning both on
statutory interpretation and on legislative intent, writing that the broad
interpretation would “transform the CFAA from an anti-hacking statute
into an expansive misappropriation statute,” despite Congress’s original
intent to create an anti-hacking statute.107
According to the court, the statutory term “without authorization”
applies to “outside hackers,” while the term “exceeds authorized access”
applies to “inside hackers.”108 This construction avoids the problem that
the court saw with the broad interpretation: it allowed criminal liability
to attach to “the vagaries of private policies that are lengthy, opaque,
subject to change, and seldom read.”109 The court cited examples of
innocuous activity that would be illegal under the broad interpretation,
such as sending a family member an email from the user’s work email
(although calling that same family member from a work phone would not
be a criminal act).110 In the internet context, a minor using Google or a
101. Id. at 583.
102. It is important to note that this holding does not appear to rest on the type of agreement.
Thus, the fact that the agreement in this case was a confidentiality agreement, rather than a mere
terms of service agreement, is irrelevant. See Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d
444, 450 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that an intentional violation of America Online’s terms of
service for the purpose of harvesting email addresses constituted unauthorized access to America
Online’s services).
103. Sowell, supra note 94, at 1752.
104. 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
105. Id. at 856.
106. See id. at 863.
107. Id. at 857–58.
108. Id. at 858.
109. Id. at 860.
110. Id. The court appears to be invoking the “avoiding absurdity” canon of construction
with this example. See generally John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV.
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user lying about his age on eHarmony would carry criminal liability.111
While the Government insisted that it would not target lesser violations,
the court reasoned that it could not support a construction that would
allow for unfettered discretion of the police.112 The court concluded that
the CFAA prohibited “improper ‘access’ of computer information[,]
not . . . misuse or misappropriation,”113 and that any other construction
would fail to take into consideration the “effect on millions of ordinary
citizens” that a broad interpretation would have.114
Whereas the Nosal court used a statutory construction that avoided
unconstitutional vagueness, one district court has held this portion of the
CFAA void for vagueness. In United States v. Drew,115 the defendant, a
middle school girl, created a fake profile on the social networking website
MySpace pretending to be an older boy to bully a fellow student.116 The
defendant added a picture of the boy to the MySpace profile without the
boy’s permission, violating MySpace’s terms of service.117 The terms of
service stated that the user was “only authorized to use the Services . . . if
[the user] agree[d] to abide by all applicable laws and to this
Agreement.”118 The jury convicted her of a misdemeanor violation of
§ 1030(a)(2)(C).119
The defendant then filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal, and the
district court granted the motion, on the grounds that the term “without
authorization” was void for vagueness.120 After reasoning that the basis
of the conviction was a violation of the MySpace terms of service, the
court held that the term “without authorization” in the statute failed both
prongs of the void for vagueness test: the term failed to give fair notice
to a citizen wishing to comport her behavior with the requirements of the
law,121 and it gave unfettered discretion to the police.122
2387, 2388 (2003) (“[J]udges may deviate from even the clearest statutory text when a given
application would otherwise produce ‘absurd’ results.”).
111. Id. at 861. In the court’s words, “describing yourself as ‘tall, dark, and handsome’ when
you’re actually short and homely, will earn you a handsome orange jumpsuit.” Id. at 862.
112. Id.; see also text accompanying notes 113–37.
113. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863 (quoting Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 692 F.
Supp. 2d 373, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
114. Id. at 862.
115. 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
116. Id. at 452.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 466.
119. Id. at 453.
120. Id. at 467–68.
121. Id. at 464–66; see also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162–66
(1972) (explicating the fair notice prong of the void for vagueness test).
122. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 466–67; see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58
(describing the police guidelines prong of the void for vagueness test).
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The court provided four reasons why the statutory language relating
to authorization failed to give fair notice. First, the court reasoned that the
acceptance of the terms of service amounted to a clickwrap contract, and
while a reasonable person might anticipate civil liability for a breach of
contract, he would never anticipate criminal penalties.123 Second, the
court reasoned that the terms of service were vague because they did not
establish whether a violation of any term within the terms of service
rendered any access unauthorized, or whether only certain violations rose
to that level.124 The court equated a violation that would result in the
termination of a user’s account with a violation that would render access
unauthorized.125 However, based on the terms of service, the court could
not determine whether violations of terms such as prohibitions on
“gambling” or “disclosing your password to a third party” would result
in the termination of the user’s account.126 Thus, the terms of service
agreement itself was too vague to be used as the basis for applying the
CFAA.
Third, and similarly, the court was very uncomfortable allowing the
owner of the website to define criminal conduct.127 The owner of the
website was under no obligation to draft terms of service with any
clarity.128 Website owners can alter the terms of service with no input
from or notice to its users.129 For example, MySpace’s terms of service
allowed MySpace to determine what was “prohibited content” at its “sole
discretion.”130 Therefore, the terms of service provided no actual notice
of culpable conduct to users. Finally, even if the terms of service were
sufficiently definite, many terms of service agreements, including that of
MySpace, contain an arbitration requirement for any dispute arising from
the terms of service.131 The court thought it was unclear whether a finding
of unauthorized access required a finding of a breach during
arbitration.132
The court also held that the statute failed to give minimal guidelines
for law enforcement.133 The court reasoned that the terms of service
123. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 464.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 464–65.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 465.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. (quoting Myspace.com Terms of Use Agreement, MYSPACE (Feb. 28, 2008),
http://www.myspace.com/misc/terms.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20041205011200/http://
www.myspace.com/misc/terms.html]).
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 466.
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agreement was so broad in scope that the breach of many provisions
would result in prosecution.134 For example, minor breaches such as a
user lying about her age to create a profile or posting a picture of a person
without his consent could qualify as a breach that results in prosecution,
even if that breach did not result in any “actual loss or . . . violation of
privacy interests.”135 While the Government argued that the statute had a
sufficient limiting factor in its mens rea requirement, interpreting this
provision of the CFAA to require wrongful intent, the court disagreed that
this imposed any significant requirement.136 The court held that even such
an interpretation would result in a “standardless sweep,” permitting law
enforcement “to pursue their personal predilections.”137
Each of these three interpretations of the term “authorized access”—
the broad interpretation that includes mere terms of service, the narrow
interpretation that excludes them, and the nihilistic interpretation that the
statute is void for vagueness—provides separate answers for the question
of whether jailbreaking constitutes unauthorized access. However,
because each interpretation is based on authorization being determined
by a terms of service agreement, an important question is whether
jailbreaking actually violates the terms of service agreement of the
device. The remainder of this Section examines two such agreements: one
for the Sony PlayStation 4 and one for the iPhone. Generally, creating a
jailbreak based on modified code seems to be a violation of the terms of
service, while manufacturers vary their terms regarding using one.
The software licensing agreement for the Sony PlayStation 4 (PS4
Agreement) seems to ban creating and using mods.138 On the subject of
creating mods, Section 2 of the agreement—entitled “Restrictions”—
states: “You may not . . . modify, patch, [or] adapt . . . System Software.
You may not reverse engineer, decompile or disassemble System
Software, create System Software derivative works, or attempt to create
System Software source code from its object code.”139 A plain language
reading of that section suggests that the act of creating a mod violates the
PS4 Agreement. To create the mod, a modder must reverse engineer the
“System Software” to determine how the software interacts with the

134. Id.
135. See id. at 466–67.
136. Id. at 467.
137. Id. (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)).
138. See PlayStation 4 System Software License Agreement, SONY COMPUT. ENTM’T INC.
(2015), http://www.scei.co.jp/ps4-eula/ps4_eula_en.html [hereinafter PS4 Agreement] (describing
restrictions on the use of System Software). Recall that modding is the video game console term
for jailbreaking. See supra text accompanying note 14.
139. PS4 Agreement, supra note 138.
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hardware of the PlayStation 4 and create a workable OS. Additionally,
the mod software itself is likely a derivative work.140
The installation of a mod also violates the PS4 Agreement. Section 2
continues:
You may not (i) use any unauthorized . . . or modified
hardware or software with System Software; (ii) use tools to
bypass, disable or circumvent any PS4 system encryption,
security or authentication mechanism; (iii) reinstall earlier
versions of the System Software (“downgrading”); . . . (v)
use any hardware or software to cause System Software to
accept or use unauthorized, illegal or pirated software or
hardware . . . .141
This is an exceptionally restrictive set of terms. The PS4 Agreement
prohibits using the type of mod that installs a new OS on the PlayStation
4.142 It also prohibits more basic mods. For example, a user cannot bypass
the system authentication mechanism, which merely checks for the
presence of authentic software.143 A user cannot circumvent the
PlayStation 4’s mechanism for ensuring that only Sony-approved
software is used on the system.144 Finally, a user cannot “downgrade” to
a previous version of Sony’s own OS.145 Thus, the PlayStation 4 prohibits
both creating and using mods.
In contrast, Apple seems to focus on the developers of jailbreak OS
software. In Subsection 2(d) of its iOS 8.1 Software License Agreement,
Apple states: “You may not, and you agree not to or enable others to,
copy . . . , decompile, reverse engineer, disassemble, attempt to derive
the source code of, decrypt, modify, or create derivative works of the iOS
Software . . . .”146 This is functionally identical to the language in the PS4
140. See 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 12:9 (West 2015); see also, e.g., Liu
v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 302 F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding an updated version of
software to be a derivative work).
141. PS4 Agreement, supra note 138.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id. This is mostly an anti-piracy measure. Rather than purchasing a PlayStation 4
game, the user could go to a website, download an image of the game, burn it onto a system disc
(here, a BluRay disc), and insert that disc into the PlayStation 4. However, the system has
technological protection measures to ensure that this does not happen and circumventing those
violates the PS4 Agreement. Nevertheless, such circumvention is the goal of many of the most
popular mods.
145. See id. This is because many mods are made to circumvent certain versions of the
system’s OS. Sony updates the OS in part to block these mods, so Sony does not want users
downgrading back to an older version that they could circumvent.
146. iOS Software License Agreement, APPLE, http://images.apple.com/legal/sla/docs/iOS81
.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2015) [hereinafter iOS Agreement] (emphasis added).
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Agreement proscribing the creation of a mod. Additionally, one may
interpret the language as prohibiting the deletion of the stock iOS
software (i.e., installing a jailbreak) because the agreement prohibits
disassembling the software.147 However, one of the canons of contract
interpretation is to give technical terms their technical meaning.148 In the
computer software context, “disassemble refers to analyzing executable
programs.149 Given the other computing terms surrounding
“disassemble,” such as “decompiling,” this seems like the appropriate
interpretation. Therefore, while installing a jailbreak does not seem to
violate the licensing agreement, creating one probably does, and thus may
be a violation of the CFAA.
Taking these two licensing agreements to be prototypical, it seems
that the act of creating a jailbreak would exceed a user’s authorized access
(or render it unauthorized) under the broad interpretation of “authorized
access” within the CFAA, consequently making jailbreak development a
violation of § 1030(a)(2)(C) in jurisdictions that subscribe to the broad
interpretation. On the other hand, the legality of installing a jailbreak
depends on whether the EULA of the device in question forbids doing so.
However, all that prevents an otherwise-legal jailbreak installation from
becoming illegal is the whim of the developer.150 That is the problem that
the Ninth Circuit and the Drew court saw in the broad interpretation of
the authorization requirement.
Notably, most licensing agreements include choice of law and venue
provisions that favor California and the Ninth Circuit.151 Both the Ninth
Circuit’s narrow interpretation152 and the Drew court’s finding of
vagueness153 suggest that a mere violation of the terms of service
agreement does not rise to the level of a CFAA violation. While a
developer-plaintiff or the Government likely could not prevail at all under
the Drew court’s rule, they might have a chance under the Ninth Circuit’s
rule. In particular, a developer-plaintiff or the Government would need to
147. See id.
148. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(3)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
149. See Benjamin Schwarz, Saumya Debray & Gregory Andrews, Disassembly of
Executable Code Revisited, 9 PROC. WORKING CONF. ON REVERSE ENGINEERING 45, 45 (2002),
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=1173063.
150. An open question is whether an element of a CFAA prosecution is that the terms of
service be a valid contract. In other words, might unconscionability be an affirmative defense?
151. See, e.g., iOS Agreement, supra note 146, § 12 (stating that the iOS Agreement is
“governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of California, excluding its
conflict of law principles”); PS4 Agreement, supra note 138, § 10 (stating that the PS4 Agreement
is “governed by, construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of California
except for its conflict of law rules”).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 103–14.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 115–37.
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argue that the act of developing or installing a jailbreak rises above a mere
terms of service agreement violation. They might argue that developing
a jailbreak is more similar to the “inside hack[ing]” that the Ninth Circuit
believed “exceeds authorized access.”154 However, without further
guidance from the Ninth Circuit, the rule seems to require more than a
violation of a terms of service agreement, so jailbreaking is likely not a
violation of § 1030(a)(2)(C) in the Ninth Circuit.
C. Jailbreaking Damages Smart Devices
Subsection 1030(a)(5) prohibits three acts with subtle differences. The
first is “knowingly caus[ing] the transmission of a program, information,
code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally caus[ing]
damage without authorization, to a protected computer.”155 The second is
“intentionally access[ing] a protected computer without authorization,
and as a result of such conduct, recklessly caus[ing] damage.”156 The
third is “intentionally access[ing] a protected computer without
authorization, and as a result of such conduct, caus[ing] damage and
loss.”157 Section II.B covers the issue of whether the access is
authorized.158 Section II.C focuses on the first of these offenses. The
primary issue is whether jailbreaking constitutes “damage.” If it does,
then the jailbreaker could be liable under (a)(5)(A).
The CFAA broadly defines “damage” as “any impairment to the
integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information.”159
As the Cybercrime Manual points out, this definition encompasses any
act that “causes data or information to be deleted or changed” or that
“changes the way a computer is instructed to operate.”160 This language
is simultaneously vague and overbroad. For example, if Alicia sends a
revised memo to Bob, who inadvertently saves the revised memo and
overwrites the original, then Alicia has caused data or information to be
154. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (emphasis omitted).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (2012).
156. Id. § 1030(a)(5)(B).
157. Id. § 1030(a)(5)(C).
158. Subsection 1030(a)(5)(A) is unique within the CFAA because the unauthorized act is
causing damage, rather than accessing an unauthorized computer. This implies that some damage
may be authorized. However, it seems logical that if a court finds accessing the phone to execute
a jailbreak to be unauthorized, then the subsequent damage must also be unauthorized. The other
subsections require that the access itself be unauthorized. While the broad interpretation of the
access element essentially establishes an equivalence between “exceeds authorized access” and
“unauthorized access,” the Ninth Circuit sees a distinction based on “inside hackers” and “outside
hackers,” respectively. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 858 (emphasis omitted). Based on this
interpretation, jailbreaking would not violate (5)(B) and (5)(C) because the “hacker” is inside.
159. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8).
160. CYBERCRIME MANUAL, supra note 26, at 39.
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deleted or changed. Alicia would not be culpable under the CFAA
because this was not Bob’s intention; however, Bob still caused damage.
Jailbreaking clearly causes damage under this definition. In the
smartphone context, where the user replaces her OS (or makes changes
to it), she has clearly impaired the “availability of . . . a program.”161 The
user intentionally overwrote the OS. Intuitively, choosing to alter one’s
own device should not constitute damage. The legislative history of the
CFAA supports this idea. The definition of damage is intentionally broad
to include “the types of harm against which people should be
protected.”162 However, Congress did not design the CFAA to protect
people from themselves. The government could only prosecute
jailbreakers (and developers could only sue them) to protect the
developers. Deleting the developer’s software likely constitutes damage
to it. The developer must be the party that the statute protects because it
is the developer who originally denied access to the user.163
The argument in the video game console context is similar. As stated
in the Introduction, most console mods involve changing the console so
that it can play games that it was not meant to play, such as games that
the user downloaded illegally. This usually involves deleting authenticity
checks,164 which changes how the “computer is instructed to operate.”165
Thus, modding a video game console also causes damage within the
statutory meaning.
Assuming that this broad interpretation of “damage” is correct, then
the second issue involves the specific actus reus and mens rea of the
defendant. There are two types of offenses within § 1030(a)(5): either the
defendant “knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information,
code, or command,”166 or the defendant “intentionally accesses a
protected computer.”167
The jailbreak developer can only be liable for the first act under
(a)(5)(A). By publishing the jailbreak on a public website, he would know
or be substantially certain that someone would download it. Moreover,
he would know that the downloader’s purpose would be to install the
jailbreak—to cause damage. He therefore knowingly put it on his
website, hoping that people would download it and intending that the
download damage the protected computer. While the jailbreak developer
161. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8).
162. S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 11 (1996).
163. Otherwise, this logic, taken to its extreme, would suggest that a user could never delete
any applications.
164. See supra Section I.B.
165. See CYBERCRIME MANUAL, supra note 26, at 39.
166. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A).
167. Id. § 1030(a)(5)(B)–(C).
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could argue that he did not know which particular protected computer his
conduct would damage, that seems irrelevant for the purposes of this
statute.168 Thus, the developer would be liable under (a)(5)(A).
Arguably, the user would also be liable under (a)(5)(A). Assuming she
did not download the jailbreak accidentally, she caused its transmission
by clicking the download button. Moreover, she must have transmitted it
from the device where she downloaded the jailbreak onto the device to
be jailbroken, intending to cause damage. However, (a)(5)(A) seems
more concerned with defendants such as the jailbreak developer.
D. Civil Liability and Criminal Punishment
Merely committing one of the offenses in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) is not
enough to trigger civil liability or criminal punishment. This Section
explores the other factors required to punish a jailbreaker.
The CFAA establishes civil liability in § 1030(g):
Any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a
violation of this section may maintain a civil action against
the violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive
relief or other equitable relief . . . only if the conduct
involves [one] of the factors set forth in subclauses (I), (II),
(III), (IV), or (V) of subsection (c)(4)(A)(i).169
The first subclause grants relief if the offense caused “loss to [one] or
more persons during any [one]-year period . . . aggregating at least
$5,000 in value.”170 The CFAA defines “loss” broadly as “any reasonable
cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an offense,
conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, program,
system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any
revenue lost [or] cost incurred.”171 Such loss would be easiest to prove in
the video game console modding context. Many console developers
release updates designed to play whack-a-mole with modders.172 If the
developer could show that the cost of developing such a patch exceeded
$5000 in value, including the standard hourly rate for employees’ time,173
168. If the statute required the defendant to know which specific computer he was targeting,
then that would exclude hackers who post malware online for any visitor to a website to download.
169. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (footnoted omitted).
170. See id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I).
171. Id. § 1030(e)(11).
172. See, e.g., Rob Crossley, Nintendo Blocks 3DS NINJHAX Hack with Firmware Update,
GAMESPOT (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.gamespot.com/articles/nintendo-blocks-3ds-ninjhaxhack-with-firmware-upd/1100-6424146/ (describing a situation where software update blocked
users from playing unlicensed games).
173. See United States v. Sablan, 92 F.3d 865, 869–70 (9th Cir. 1996); CYBERCRIME
MANUAL, supra note 26, at 43.
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then the developer would meet this requirement. In the criminal context,
the prosecution would meet it as well, since the statute only requires the
loss to “any victim.”174 However, it seems unlikely that the mere use of a
jailbreak would rise to this level.
The second subclause provides a remedy if the offense modified or
impaired the “medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of [one]
or more individuals.”175 Doctors frequently use tablets176 in medical
examinations.177 If the jailbroken tablet somehow interfered with the
examination (e.g., the tablet lost its capability to access the Internet at a
critical time during the examination), then a plaintiff may be able to add
a CFAA claim to his medical malpractice claim. However, as the example
demonstrates, this seems to be extremely unlikely.
The fourth and fifth subclauses are the most disturbing. They create
the possibility of compensatory or injunctive relief if the offense created
a “threat to public health or safety” or “affect[ed] a computer used by or
for an entity of the United States Government in furtherance of the
administration of justice, national defense, or national security.” 178 This
is concerning because the National Security Agency (NSA)—through a
government program such as PRISM—may have installed “back door[s]”
on devices such as smartphones for surveillance purposes.179
Additionally, many service providers store information such as text
message logs, which the gvernment can subpoena.180 Suppose that a
person developed a jailbreak to cripple the ability of the NSA and service
providers to intercept or store messages. That gives rise to a number of
questions that are beyond the scope of this Note. First, could the
government argue that the jailbreaker created a threat to public safety,
particularly if she released the jailbreak? Second, could someone who
used the jailbreak be considered to have affected a computer used by the
174. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11) (emphasis added).
175. Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(II).
176. While this Note has not yet discussed tablets, since they are essentially larger
smartphones (though not exempt from the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)), they can
likely be treated in the same way as smartphones for the purposes of the CFAA.
177. Kevin Bostic, As Medicine Goes Digital, Apple’s iPad Is Top Choice Among Doctors,
APPLEINSIDER (May 31, 2013, 9:37 AM), http://appleinsider.com/articles/13/05/31/as-medicinegoes-digital-apples-ipad-is-top-choice-among-doctors (claiming that fifty-one percent of officebased doctors use a mobile device for medical reference and that fifty-nine percent of doctors
integrate tablets into their operations).
178. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(IV)–(V).
179. See Privacy Scandal: NSA Can Spy on Smart Phone Data, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Sept. 7,
2013, 6:00 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/privacy-scandal-nsa-can-spy-onsmart-phone-data-a-920971.html; Timothy B. Lee, Here’s Everything We Know About PRISM to
Date, WASH. POST (June 12, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/
06/12/heres-everything-we-know-about-prism-to-date/.
180. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b).
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government in furtherance of justice? If not, could she fall within this
subclause if she was under investigation and jailbroke her phone to
prevent surveillance? Would she have to know she was under
surveillance for subclause (V) to apply? Finally, if the answer to any one
of those questions is yes, could the gvernment get an injunction to force
such a jailbreaker to install surveillance software on her own phone? That
clearly raises a Fourth Amendment issue.
The CFAA establishes criminal liability in § 1030(c). The level of
punishment depends on the section of the CFAA used to convict the
defendant. If the defendant were convicted under (a)(2)(C), then the
defendant would only be punished if one of three criteria were met: (1)
the defendant developed or used the jailbreak for “commercial advantage
or private financial gain”;181 (2) the defendant developed or used the
jailbreak “in furtherance of any criminal or tortious act in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State;”182 or (3) “the
value of the information obtained [through the jailbreak] exceeds
$5,000.”183 Each of these three provisions could apply. For example, if
the defendant, a jailbreak developer, included on his website a link to his
PayPal, that might trigger the first provision. Similarly, because modding
a video game console is not an exception to the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA), installing a mod might be done in furtherance
of a criminal act (violating the DMCA). Finally, while a user might not
obtain more than $5000 in installing the jailbreak, the developer might
obtain this much money (through advertising, for example).
If the defendant were convicted under (a)(5)(A), then the first use or
development of a jailbreak is likely a misdemeanor,184 unless a court finds
that the use or development of a jailbreak results in a loss of at least
$5000, in which case the use or development of a jailbreak would be a
felony.185 That determination is the same as the one that a court would
need to make in connection with a conviction under (a)(2)(C). Lastly,
regardless of which clause is used to target jailbreakers (users or
developers), the second time a jailbreaker is convicted for modifying her
own device, she is a felon.186
CONCLUSION
Jailbreak development and use likely violates 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(a)(5)(A). In jurisdictions that hold that a violation of a terms of
181. Id. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(i).
182. Id. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(ii).
183. Id. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(iii).
184. See id. § 1030(c)(4)(G)(i).
185. See id. § 1030(c)(4)(B)(i).
186. See id. § 1030(c)(2)(A), for a conviction under (a)(2)(C). See id. § 1030(c)(4)(C)(i), for
a conviction under (a)(5)(A).
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service agreement or EULA constitutes exceeding authorized access (or
rendering future access unauthorized), development also violates 18
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). The legality of jailbreaking depends on the
tolerance of the manufacturers in such jurisdictions. However, in the
Ninth Circuit, where most litigation involving jailbreaking takes place, it
seems that jailbreaking would not violate the CFAA.
Given the legislative history of the CFAA, it does not seem that
legislating compliance with a terms of service agreement was the goal of
the Act. The CFAA was designed to prevent hackers from gaining access
to and acquiring information from computers worthy of protection—
those of banks and the government itself. However, it seems that by being
clumsy with wording and drafting in terms overbroad in scope, Congress
has made it a crime for a user to make unacceptable alterations to the
user’s own device. Given that the CFAA is a virtual analogue of a trespass
statute, this is illogical. As the Ninth Circuit and the Drew court noted,
allowing private entities to define the criminal law with no definiteness
requirements could lead to disastrous results. Congress should rewrite the
CFAA to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s holding that violating a terms of use
agreement does not exceed authorized access, at least if the user owns the
device. Thus, device manufacturers could deal with jailbreakers
privately, and users could be left to their own devices.
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